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At an African microfinance conference in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso (July 2009), Konan Banny (former Prime Minster
of Ivory Coast) said: “The UNDP’s millennium goal is to halve
world poverty by 2015. We realise now that this will not be25999.
n.eu
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2.11.001achieved, at least for our part of the world.”2 Similar
statements are common indicating that Africa many not
meet any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(Easterly, 2009). However, there is hope, and this paper
provides a simple solution to a part of the first MDG: that of
eradicating extreme hunger and poverty, or at least reducing
by half the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in
1990 by 2015. The three targets and nine indicators of
performance of MDG 1 are provided in Appendix 1. More
specifically, two of the indicators of the first MDG are related
to this paper: 1.2 proportion of population below $1 (ppp3)
per day; 1.6 proportion of employed people living below $1
(ppp) per day.2 Reported in Microfinance Focus July 10, 2009, available at http://
www.microfinancefocus.com/news/2009/07/10/exclusive-africa-
prefers-microfinance-route-to-reach-millennium-goal/. This view
is echoed by 2009. Millennium Development Goals Report (2009),
United Nations.
3 ppp is purchasing power parity.
n and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 7During my first visit to Africa, I interviewed 17 micro-
entrepreneurs using formal, mostly open-ended structured
questions, each taking half an hour to fill. The respondents
were almost all poor artisans/entrepreneurs trying to make
a living. The one multiple-choice question asked was about
their self-perceived success rate. Nobody ticked totally
successful. But somedid tick totally failed. Theotherswere in
between. Clearly, something needs to be done for millions of
people who can see, thanks to televisions and telephones,
that they are certainly not having what is considered success.
Table 1 presents some data on the poverty in terms of
earnings.
Column 3 of Table 1 shows thatWorld GNI per capita is $26
a day. This is influenced by a daily GNI of almost $100 per day
for OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) countries. However, regions such as the Sub-
Saharan Africa earn a daily average of only $3.5 a day. The
23 poorest countries selected for this display, over-
whelmingly from Africa, are all earning less than $2 per day.
These 23 countries account for a population of 450 million
out of the world population of about 7 billion in 2011.
To appreciate this paper, it would be useful to
remember that the World Bank defined the poorest of the
poor as those earning less than $1 a day and the poor as
those earning less than $2 a day. The purchasing power
parity of much of Africa is a little over $2 for a $1 in
American dollars in the US. A ppp of a dollar a day means
$365 ppp a year. All countries with a GNI per capita of less
than $365 ppp are living on the average in extreme poverty.
Even these reported averages are skewed up by a few rich
people. Thus, the GNI per capita figures represent more
than 50% of the population living below that figure.4 Simi-
larly, $2 ppp a day, works out to $730 ppp a year for more
than 50% of the population. Whether you look at GNI or at
ppp, it is clear that many African countries are at least
poor, if not extremely poor. This is despite fast growing
microfinance in this region, but admittedly growing slower
in the poorest countries (Cote d’Ivoire is an exception of
a rather rich country performing poorly in microfinance for
other reasons (Ashta & Fall, 2012)).
Moreover, if GDP growth is not eaten up by inflation, it
certainly will be eaten up by population growth. Thus, many
countries are at best standing still and any reduction in
poverty is an illusion which is lost when, in 2008, the World
Bank revised its poverty numbers up by 25% to $1.25 ppp and
showed that any gain in the fight against poverty has indeed
been little. A more recent World Bank press release (2012)
indicates that there is some progress, but little for Africa, and
the progress isminimal ifwe take the $2per day poverty line.5
What then can be done? Many solutions have been
grasped and tried but at best, they have given inadequate
results. The next section provides a literature review of
some of the different solutions suggested. In the third4 GNI coefficients from the World Bank could provide an indication
of income inequalities.
5 World Bank’s (2012) press release no. 2012/297/DEC: “Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA): For the first time since 1981, less than half of
its population (47%) lived below $1.25 a day. The rate was 51% in
1981. The $1.25-a-day poverty rate in SSA has fallen 10 percentage
points since 1999.”section, pursuing the need to add something new to what is
known (Calderisi, 2006; Easterly, 2006), we propose
a minimum wage solution. While the solution is not new,
the fixing of specific targets is original.
In the world of economics and management theory that
we shape for the future, the paper will orient towards the
question of whether existing economic and management
solutions, such as the one proposed here, are sufficient to
fulfil the larger goal of human upliftment and more
specifically, whether any new viable theory helps to
understand policy measures in this area. An open question
is whether financial inclusion benefits the poor or benefits
the rich or both and how these gains are traded off. In such
a global economy, new political trade-offs can also be ex-
pected: is a global minimum wage more sustainable than
a local minimum wage pressurised by threats by capital to
go elsewhere? Any proposed solution needs to anticipate
possible critiques. This is done in the fourth section. The
fifth section concludes.
A review of suggested solutions and their
inadequacy
The problem contextualised in a globalised
economy with high speed information
Business cycles and financial crisis are the natural state of
capitalism and perhaps orchestrated as part of the profit
motivation central to the assumptions of economics
(Veblen, 1904). In a simplistic political game model, one
person in a group has all the power. He can create
economic policies to ensure that he gets all and others get
nothing (a corner solution in a one period game). In a multi-
period game, the others have the power to exclude him to
the point of not purchasing from him or robbing him
outright. Profit maximisation therefore requires some
amount of redistribution by sharing the surplus with the
rest of the community (customers/workers) through higher
than necessary wage rates or lower than necessary prices
(Hill & Cassill, 2004). Minimum wage legislation can be
viewed in this light. The political model favoured by clas-
sical models is a free market capitalist model with ratio-
nality attributed to purely economic motives such as profit
or utility maximisation and the attendant monetary system
in allocating value and some simplifying assumptions. Once
the capitalist model or the economic motive has been
undermined or the assumptions proved to be materially
unrealistic, there is need for alternative theories such as
behavioural finance and institutional theories, to help make
economics an evolutionary science, though we may
continue to go back and forth on whether economics could
integrate these alternative views.
It is often difficult to separate trends which are
a continuation of evolutions from a pre-crisis stage to
trends in a post-crisis stage, notably trends which come
from globalisation and Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) changes to trends which are more reactive
to the crisis (new laws). Probably, we can simplify and
indicate that technologies have just increased the velocity
of transactions and globalisation has increased the scale of
transactions. In such a simple, perhaps simplistic, version,
Table 1 Gross National Income (GNI) and population in poorest countries and selected regions.
2011 For the year Per day Population
(in millions)Country name GNI per capita,
Atlas method
(current US$)
GNI per
capita, PPP
(current
international $)
GNI per capita,
Atlas method
(current US$)
GNI per capita,
PPP (current
international $)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 190 350 0.52 0.96 67.76
Liberia 240 520 0.66 1.42 4.13
Burundi 250 610 0.68 1.67 8.58
Sierra Leone 340 850 0.93 2.33 6.00
Malawi 340 870 0.93 2.38 15.38
Niger 360 720 0.99 1.97 16.07
Ethiopia 400 1110 1.10 3.04 84.73
Eritrea 430 580 1.18 1.59 5.42
Madagascar 430 950 1.18 2.60 21.32
Guinea 440 1050 1.21 2.88 10.22
Central African Republic 470 810 1.29 2.22 4.49
Mozambique 470 980 1.29 2.68 23.93
Uganda 510 1320 1.40 3.62 34.51
Nepal 540 1260 1.48 3.45 30.49
Tanzania 540 1510 1.48 4.14 46.22
Togo 560 1030 1.53 2.82 6.15
Rwanda 570 1240 1.56 3.40 10.94
Burkina Faso 570 1310 1.56 3.59 16.97
Guinea-Bissau 600 1250 1.64 3.42 1.55
Mali 610 1050 1.67 2.88 15.84
Gambia 610 2060 1.67 5.64 1.78
Chad 690 1370 1.89 3.75 11.53
Haiti 700 1190 1.92 3.26 10.12
23 reporting less
than $2 a day
435 1018 1.19 2.79 454.10
World 9491 11,574 26.00 31.71 6973.74
OECD members 35,986 35,094 98.59 96.15 1245.20
Sub-Saharan Africa
(all income levels)
1266 2251 3.47 6.17 875.56
Source: Based on World Bank Quick query data downloaded on Sept 21, 2012.
8 A. Ashtawe would only need to add international institutions and
create economic policy at a global level.
One possibility of saving the system from crisis is to
redistribute. That redistribution takes place but inequalities
do not decrease6 is the perpetual paradox of capitalist
economics, which can be understood in our game as
a perpetual tradeoff of the powerful player between his
short term profit maximisation and long term threat of
exclusion. A key assumption is that such redistribution would
give purchasing power to those who would purchase and
bring profit back to the same person. Initially, the role of the
State was considered the single most important factor in
making this redistribution. In a global economy, it becomes
the role of public international institutions. Global economic
capitalism requires global redistribution to permit creation
(of economic opportunities) as well as stabilisation.6 In Costa Rica, inequalities reduced from the mid 1970s to mid
1980s and then troughed out and then increased from 1992 to 1997
(Gindling & Trejos, 2005).What complicates such simplistic international/global
application of the one-country model is that different
countries have different political systems and therefore the
key assumptions which may work in a one-country model
have difficulties surviving in models with alternative non-
capitalist systems in different stages of economic devel-
opment, with varying amounts of informal economy, with
different political systems and different human geograph-
ical needs. The extent of financial inclusion into the global
economy also creates its own problems to the global profit
maximiser as the informal economy shields it from the
volatility required by financial optimisers, as reflected in
the varying country betas. A school of fiscal federalism
would suggest that people vote with their feet and all move
to the rich country with elaborate social security, leading to
desertification of other areas. However, to limit immigra-
tion and social security costs, including employment
threats to local voting population, the richer jurisdictions
may have laws such as special diplomas for specific fields.
A second complication comes from the increased infor-
mation and higher education level owing to the ICTs which
permit people to understand the changes in behaviour of
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 9firms and their own Heads of State and to penalise them
based on some notions of ethical fairplay. These ethics
therefore require an understanding of society. Failure of
firms to conform to social expectations can have economic
repercussions (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986a, 1986b)
and the failure of Heads of States to conform to social
expectations can have political repercussions, as recent
political revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East
have shown (February 2011). Add this to the first compli-
cation of globalisation, and firms need to factor in diverse
social expectations of their behaviour and maximise profit
based on expected penalties of not conforming to divergent
social expectations of multiple stakeholders. Thus an
evolved version of the stakeholder theory (Freeman &
Liedtka, 1991), such as Value Based Networks (Wheeler,
Colbert, & Freeman, 2003) or Inter-Systems Model of Busi-
ness (Stormer, 2003), would require maximising value for all
stakeholders replacing profit maximisation subject to
stakeholder constraints. This is even more so, in a world of
increased number of small firm collaborations (Means &
Schneider, 2000) where the predominant issues of trust
(staying with the network) and abandonment (leapfrogging
to a better one) come out strongly (Ashta, 2009).
Third, the firm with its agents and principals is not
necessarily conforming to the simple profit maximisation
model and elaborate theories account for rent seeking of
managers and transaction costs of owners to provide some
coherence to this system. However, when the goal of actors
is no longer profit maximisation, but the maximisation of
their overall image based on a double or triple bottom line,
economics fails to predict/explain their actions. An
example of such behaviour is the rise of private interna-
tional aid institutions, which indicates that the profit
motive in business is being supplemented not with
a consumption or saving alternative in private spheres, but
with the motive of creating a mark in society (egoistic
altruism?) which means that money (income, wealth) is no
longer serving the purpose of indicating/measuring contri-
bution to society once myopia based on expected life is
factored in. In such a limited time horizon, managers (with
expected retirement age) and owners (with life expec-
tancy) find that their overall image maximisation (in a one
incarnation expectation) requires redistribution in a short
time frame and perhaps increased financial volatility
required to bring back benefits faster.
In a nutshell, in a global connected world, economics
(profit/risk) and social standing is a function of economic
returns as well as perceived social impact of different
actions of the manager/owners, both of which are
increasingly visible to other stakeholders who can punish
non-conforming behaviour. To reduce financial crisis glob-
ally, the redistribution of income is required globally.
However, monetary redistribution is not sufficient: social
impact needs to be estimated and proved for the different
agents to have their total image maximisation. Without the
perceived social impact, dissipating their funds will not
provide them image gains (and indirectly monetary gains)
which they may be seeking from their egoist altruism. As
opposed to all this, to gain more from global volatility,
increased formal economy integration is required.
The question for this paper is to what extent existing
economic tools which can be used in a one-country setting,with minimal need for corporate social responsibility
(Friedman, 1970), can be applied to (1) a global setting (2)
where discretionary benevolence adds to the total prestige
beyond that accorded by profits, and (3) which may also
require sharing profits with multiple stakeholders. Much of
the debate in development economics and different forms
of international redistribution, in the public and private
intervention spheres, can be understood by looking at this
tendency of trying to use simple existing tools, such as the
one on minimum wages proposed here, to the need for
ushering in global growth along with the redistribution
necessary for stability, as opposed to actions required to
promote visibility of institutions granting aid.
A discussion of existing solutions in isolation
One evident solution would be to reduce population which
eats up growth. The high fertility rates (5.8 children per
woman in the West African Economic and Monetary Union,
see Table 1 of Ashta and Fall (2012)) may be partly due to the
low life expectancy of 55 years (compared to about 80 years
in much of the developed world). The problem is that
fertility rates depend on customs and beliefs which them-
selves follow economic conditions by a generation, as
suggested by the theory of demographic transition. There-
fore, unless living conditions improve, people will have a lot
of children, hoping some will help them in their old age.
Education and ICTs may have helped increase awareness of
the problem but religious and social sanctions may be diffi-
cult to overcome if economic conditions do not first improve.
A second solution is that aid is required (Sachs, 2005, p.
398). Some studies show that aid is effective in increasing
Gross Domestic Income (GDI) and reducing poverty
(Dalgaard & Erickson, 2009). However, even aid specialists
are critical of much of the grand scheme of distributing aid
(Easterly, 2006). Generations of aid are now being criticised
for making Africans dependent (Moyo, 2009) and corrupt
(Calderisi, 2006). It is neither clear, therefore, that aid is
having an impact nor is it clear how much aid is required to
help Africa meet its MDG of reducing by half the percentage
of people living in abject poverty, and in any case all this
would be subject to the assumptions used in the model
(Dalgaard & Erickson, 2009). One possible modification
could be that aid should be converted to social security
entitlements at the grass-roots rather than discretionary
one-time boosts. The entitlements would then free the
poor of worry and they could perhaps take actions which
are more conducive to their overall welfare than searching
for multiple activities to make ends meet.
A third solution termed bottom of the pyramid or base of
the pyramid sees the poor as the solution rather than the
problem (Prahalad, 2006). It requires inclusion of poor
people in the market-place as a source of profit for multi-
nationals, and at the same time as a way out of poverty. At
Ouagadougou, I saw row after row of shops offering similar
products, with no customers, and with the more active
salesmen pestering tourists. Any positive response by
tourists, weary of harassment, would give wrong market
information to produce more undesired goods and more
harassment! The only stakeholder who made a one-time
gain was the firm who was supplying all the unwanted (in
terms of effective demand) goods to all the retailers,
10 A. Ashtaa problem often seen in “pyramid” sales structures.7 Thus,
globalisation may have facilitated supply of goods and ICTs
may have increased the perceived need for goods, but
without providing purchasing power to the poor and
a variety of goods and services offered, merely including
the poor in the distribution process is insufficient, by itself,
to create sales.
A fourth solution has been microfinance (Yunus, 2003).
This is also termed inclusive finance. Themovement has been
growing at 30% per year. It is hailed as amessiah by some, and
a failure in impact by others (Roodman & Morduch, 2009). It
suffices to say that in the sample of 17 artisans mentioned
earlier, small as it may be, most people had never taken any
loans. Those who had taken loans took them from family or
friends. Only one had a savings account. None had taken
a loan from the formal or semi-formal microfinance organi-
sation. Future research is required to corroborate official or
volunteered figures on who is taking these loans. Another
significant factor is that Bangladesh, the country with the
leading microfinance, is amongst the top twenty in the list of
Failed States Index 2009.8 At the same time, efforts by the
microfinance institutions have clearly led to somewelfare for
poor women.9 The tradeoff of whether microfinance is good
and helps entrepreneurs earn money or whether it is merely
consumer lending leading to over-indebtedness requires
a case by case analysis. However, we can see, especially by
a study of the failure of the microfinance sector in India and
the furore created by talk of suicides (Ashta, Khan, & Otto,
2011), that unless all stakeholders, the poor, the firms, and
the governments interact to create sound ethical rules,
a sector cannot survive. What is good ethics is also being
influenced by globalisation and education.
A fifth solution has been the necessity to create property
rights (Soto, 2000, p. 276). To get economies of scale, the
sample of eight West African countries studied by Ashta and
Fall (2012) have got together in a monetary and economic
union. They are creating not only laws which are common,
but even model decrees of application to be passed by each
country so that no public manpower needs to be wasted in
reinventing appropriate decrees. However, the countries do
not have the resources to enforce the laws and all the
legislation is of little use if nobody knows about them.10 So,7 I cannot help making the comparison with the use of “pyramid”.
8 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_
failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
9 In a recent visit (January 2010) to a microfinance group repay-
ment meeting in a village near Hapur (65 km from New Delhi), the
women were happy that they could now contribute money and
finance to their family businesses and, moreover, had learnt to sign
their names. In a visit to a suburban point of sale outlet near
Gurgaon (India), we could see the power of mobile telephone
operated accounts and remittances.
10 Two of my respondents in Ouagadougou indicated that they
would like information on how they can get funding for their
associations. While I could provide information on online websites,
they would not possibly be able to read English or understand the
technical jargon of the global financial industry. Most of my
respondents were illiterate and I had to fill up the questionnaire
myself. They were proud of the fact that they spoke French
without any schooling. However, from speaking French to reading
online financial and technical French is a big step.the creation of property rights, without appropriate infor-
mation and enforcement, is far away from reducing
poverty.11
A sixth mantra has been education. While we need to
provide education to the millions of poor people, it is
perhaps worthwhile questioning what we consider educa-
tion here. A paper on microfinance in the North African
region (Allaire, Ashta, Attuel-Mendes, & Krishnaswamy,
2009), shows that Algeria was the most integrated of the
French colonies (Tunisia and Morocco were protectorates).
As a result, the Algerian education system from the 1920s to
1960 reflected the French education system with very high
literacy rates especially for women. Surprisingly, today,
Algerian women have not emerged as leaders of micro-
finance nor of entrepreneurship and have, instead, been
relegated to the background. Such an isolated example
cannot indicate that education is of no use, but it could
warn that mere literacy and importing developed country
models of education and values are insufficient conditions
to development. In any case, something more than educa-
tion is necessary: perhaps a distinction needs to be made to
encourage livelihood education. It may also be interesting
to note that education may be good for the average person.
But some people have more innate abilities to use educa-
tion than others. Thus, instead of reducing poverty of those
who lack these abilities, education can also increase the
inequalities in productive capacity, and lead to an increase
in poverty for those who have some, but inadequate,
amounts of education. Partly, this problem is limited in
a single-country framework, because each country is spe-
cialising in different industries and is educating its people
in different ways. But in a globalised framework, with
universal access to education, the most educated/skilled
workers could be found in, say, India and this would impact
firms situated in America. Either the firm moves to India,
creating problems for the unskilled workers in the US who
then lose their jobs, or the skilled Indians are allowed to
immigrate to the US, creating other sociological questions
(many unresearched). Either way, multiple stakeholders
are impacted and economics alone is inadequate to the
task. A secondary question I’m posing is that if total global
material wants can be satisfied by only a part of the world’s
population working, why should the rest of the world be
educated in the conventional sense to keep a reserve army
of employable persons for those stakeholders who would
like to limit wage increases? This question requires a return
to the debate of the 35 hour week in France: should people
share work or should some work and provide a dole to
others (Ashta 2000)?
A seventh solution proposed is that of holistic local level
solutions allowing people to provide livelihood and creating
local participatory institutions for the excluded, as is done
by BRAC in Bangladesh (Mair & Marti, 2009). This solution
recognises that existing institutions serve the needs of the
elite stakeholders who would not like to be destabilised.
Therefore, the excluded have to be provided with new11 None of the people I interviewed in Ouagadougou in 2009 had
heard of microfinance. A recent Gallup Poll indicates that in nearby
Ivory Coast only 18% of the poor are aware of microfinance (Marlar,
2010, p. 2).
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 11institutions and to permit these to prevail, collaboration
with existing institutions is required. An easy to understand
concrete example is the caste based problems in villages in
India where lower caste people are not allowed to come up
if the existing caste based social and political institutions
are not de facto modified. The solution would require
economic or social incentives to village based upper castes
to help lower caste people in their own villages.
Yet another solution which is proposed is public sector
employment (Karnani, 2007), which disagrees with the
Bottom of the Pyramid approach and reflects more the
reality that there is nothing at the bottom of the pyramid
except possibly empty shops such as those seen in Ouaga-
dougou. Karnani encourages public expenditure on the
development of infrastructure through the employment of
all the poor. It leaves unanswered the question on what the
poor are going to do with the infrastructure which is not
required by business. But spending on infrastructure itself
will improve welfare of those who do manage to use it: so in
terms of consumption welfare it would help more than
spending on arms, for example.12
Evidently, nobody is indicating that any of the above
solutions works in isolation. Everybody is suggesting that his
solution be added on to the basket of solutions, to eradi-
cate poverty. It is worthwhile to note that the OECD
countries as well as the developing countries are trying to
implement all of these. So are rich donors, social investors,
socially responsible investors, and even commercial
investors.
It is, at the same time, necessary to remember, that for
Africa at least, it has not worked. So, are we going to let
Africa drop for 2015, as suggested by the participant in the
Ouagadougou conference, and instead leave them to later
generations? Also, the use of averages may confuse issues.
It is possible that there are more poor in India than in Africa
(Chen & Ravallion, 2008) and the rural poor in India may be
poorer than the poor in Africa.
We recommend adding a minimum wage rate based
policy to all the others discussed previously. The solution is
an existing institution, but requires reinforcement and
upscaling. For it to work, a buy-in from different stake-
holders is required to obtain immediate financing. This kind
of collaboration with existing institutions is at a national
and global level rather than at a local level studied by Mair
and Marti (2009).
The recommended increased minimum wage
rate solution
Before we present the proposal on increasing the minimum
wage, it is better to justify it through a literature review of
its impact.
However, at the outset, two major limitations of our
proposal are recognised:12 In a recent private exchange of correspondence with the presi-
dent of a socially responsible investment fund dedicated to
microfinance and affiliated areas, the president indicated that she
cannot consider investing in Africa since Africans seem unable to
use any investment or aid.1) Most of those in poverty are those who are not formally
employed and
2) That the minimum wages in most developing countries
apply only to formal sector employment.
Yet the proposal is being offered recognising that
 The working poor are an important part of society and
are receiving attention from researchers (Bernabe &
Kolev, 2005). There is even a suggestion that the
working poor need more support than the unemployed
(Berner, Ozer, & Paynter, 2008).
 The work with the most deeply affected in Africa will
not suffice to place them above the poverty line by
2015, and we must at least do what we can for those
who can benefit now.
 Reaching the goal for the working poor will show some
progress and this may reinforce the motivation of the
leaders to do more for other segments of the
population.
 When the working poor move up, it would provide
incentives to others to follow their examples.
 There will be linkage and multiplier impacts when the
working poor spend their money to purchase informal
services.
This paper only seeks to propose marginal changes to
help meet two indicators of performance, promised by the
MDGs. These indicators do not by themselves guarantee
better standards of living. Linkage effects to the rest of the
economy of these measures will also take time and are not
treated here.
Minimum wages now exist universally outside the Middle
East (ILO, 2009). The case for minimum wages has been
recently reviewed (Devereux, 2005; Todorovic & Ma, 2008)
and we will provide only a general overview.
In the traditional classical economics view, a minimum
wage rate, if above the equilibrium rate, creates a distor-
tion in the economy, increasing supply of labour and
reducing demand for labour, thus creating unemployment.
The welfare increase of those getting more wages is offset
by the disemployment of those who lose their jobs. More-
over, the better paid workers will raise the costs for those
industries which will then become internationally uncom-
petitive and laid off workers will depress wages in the
informal economy. There is a problem of enforcing
compliance to minimum wages in the informal sectors
(Devereux, 2005).
On the other hand, Devereux (2005) also shows that
a number of studies have looked at empirics and found that
the evidence does not support the traditional view. In fact,
minimum wages increase the welfare of the poorest.
Moreover, by providing purchasing power to the classes
which have a high marginal propensity to consume, it
creates a multiplier effect which leads to the growth of the
economy towards full employment and, if there is already
full employment, to inflation. However, in poor countries
which are far from full employment, this inflation threat is
not valid except for structural rigidities (which of course
exist). The noneconomic welfare aspects of a minimum
wage include protection from the tyranny of employers,
14 Draper and Maitre (2009) study Somalia and point out that post-
independence, the only stable period for Somalia was during the
regime of the dictator Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre (1969e1991), but
12 A. Ashtaespecially in the non-unionised sector. Moreover, better
paid workers consume better and are healthier, thus
increasing their productivity. To the extent that monop-
sonist buyers of labour were paying them below their
marginal productivity, a rise of the minimum wage rate
would reduce the exploitation but would not lead to
a reduction in employment. In addition, an increase in
minimum wages in the formal sector may increase the
wages in the informal sector either because of increased
demand for goods and services or because of a benchmark
effect: the wages in the informal sector are indexed by
employers based on the formal sector’s minimum wage rate
(Devereux, 2005). Finally, minimum wages may be rein-
vested for increased education, more productive operating
practices, and the emphasis on skill development and high
value activities (Todorovic & Ma, 2008).
As a result, many economists are advocating the uti-
lisation of minimum wages for development. In many
countries, minimum wage rates are introduced only to
avoid the worst exploitation of employers. As a result, they
are fixed at a level much lower than the average wage rates
of the economy. A recent report by ILO indicates that the
most frequent scenario is that countries set their minimum
wages at around 40% of average wages (ILO, 2009), but the
graph presented in the report indicates that at least a few
countries set their minimum wages in the 6%e20% range of
average wages and therefore the impact is minimal. Only
a few outliers sent their minimum wages at more than 70%
of average wages.
A review of minimum wages in Sub-Saharan Africa indi-
cates that it is set below the $2 a day poverty line but
higher than the $1 a day poverty line, but that the real
minimum wage is falling over time (Devereux, 2005).
However, more recent data (2001e2007) by the ILO indi-
cates that this trend has been corrected and minimum
wages have been increasing at 6.5% per annum in devel-
oping countries in real terms. The effect of the economic
crisis, though, shows that in 2008 half the countries have
increased real minimum wages, while the other half have
allowed inflation to erode their real value (ILO, 2009). The
minimum wage has increased from 37% in 2000e02 to 39% of
average wages in 2004e07 (ILO, 2008).
Moreover, in countries where minimum wage exists, it
may either be universal as in Brazil (Lemos, 2007) or
applied selectively to some sectors. There is mixed
evidence on its impact: it increases unemployment and
depresses wages in some countries and has a benevolent
impact elsewhere (Devereux, 2005), for example in Brazil
(Lemos, 2007). Devereux (2005) astutely remarks that to
reach the MDGs it would be advisable to increase the wages
of the better-off people (near the poverty line) than to
bother about the poorest of the poor, even though a Rawl-
sian13 welfare optimisation would suggest trying to increase
the benefits of the poorest. In fact, the evidence in Brazil
shows that the private sector impact of the minimum wage
is not on the poorest wage earners but on the higher income
groups because non-compliance is high (Lemos, 2007).13 Rawlsian ethics admits measures which profit the rich as long as
these create incentives to improve the lot of the poorest.The use of an efficiency wage, i.e., a wage higher than
the market clearing wage, may lead to positive impacts
that an exogenously fixed minimum wages would not, by
reducing shirking and increasing productivity (Basu, 2004).
However, this requires employers to understand these
concepts, which may not be the case in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa, except for multi-national corporations and
a few visionary local entrepreneurs.
The method of setting minimum wage rates could
be trade union bargaining or government ordinances, both
set on a benchmark of either marginal productivity or
consumption basket standards. However, it is often below
the subsistence level. Lemos (2007) explains that the Bra-
zilian constitution of 1988 redefined subsistence level for
the family, but it was unaffordable at the minimum wage
rate.
In this paper, we ask that, to meet the MDG of 2015, the
level of the minimum wage be higher than the poverty line
of $1 a day in terms of ppp, but that it takes into account
that a family in Africa has about six children. We argue that
the beneficiaries of such minimum wages would, in turn,
help to increase the wages of the poorest and therefore
Rawlsian criteria would eventually be satisfied. An example
of such a possible global minimum wage rate is discussed in
Appendix 2.
A stakeholder based justification of the
solution: why it needs to be global
We examine here a few major stakeholders in rich coun-
tries and in poor countries. Let us assume for sake of
simplicity, following Buchanan and Tullock (1965), that
laws are expensive and need to be bought by interested
people, and extend this even to the modification of
decrees. The ability to change laws and decrees therefore
lies with the rich. These include the rich in rich countries,
the rich in poor countries and, perhaps, some influence of
the workers in rich countries. All three stakeholders have
to acquiesce in the provision of benefits to the fourth
stakeholder: the poor in poor countries by a unilateral
increase in their minimum wages. Since we have assumed,
implicitly, that the politicians are mere tools obeying the
command of money, we could exclude them from our
analysis, for simplicity.14 However, a politician who tries
to use this solution without a buy-in of the relevant stake-
holders risks losing his job, as recent events in Honduras
show: a president who increased the minimum wage to
$290 a month was ousted by his army troops.15 Therefore,
although we want to increase the minimum wage to
only $60 ($120 in ppp) as a first step, we need to work
hard to get approval of local rich stakeholders who may
feel that their immediate profits would reduce fromthe minute he became financially weak after a war with Ethiopia,
the Hawiye clan chased him out. Therefore, it is not sufficient that
we look only at a group of stakeholders but also the important sub-
groups within them.
15 Time, July 13 2009, p. 2 “Postcard: Tegucigalpa”.
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 13existing businesses and we need to include the local
political institution in the developing country as a fifth
stakeholder.
Businesses in developed countries
Businesses in developed countries clearly have an advan-
tage in having a work force which is poor and acquiescing
to low wage rates in their own country. A threat to relo-
cate to a low wage country can induce a freeze in
minimum wages in developed countries to the level of
inflation. This threat is credible if the wages in poor
countries are lower. Thus, businesses in developed coun-
tries may be opposed to increases in minimum wages in
developing countries in order to keep wages rising in their
home country. However, for this threat to be credible, it is
not necessary that the difference in minimum wages
between rich and poor countries is as huge as it is today.
Even an increase of minimum wages in Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) to $120 ppp a month would allow a suffi-
cient difference in wages to halt the ever-increasing
demand by unions and syndicates of labour in rich coun-
tries to understand that further wage increases are diffi-
cult to sustain in the wake of globalisation and
development of ICTs.
A second objection to increased minimum wages in
developing countries for businesses in developed countries,
is globalisation and the increasingly global supply and value
chains. As a result, for their overall competitiveness,
transnational corporations are searching for lower wages in
poor countries. They would, as a result, be less inclined to
favour higher minimum wages.
However, often less highlighted, the firms of the devel-
oped world need aggregate demand to keep growing. The
current financial crisis, often blamed on the financial
sector’s lack of prudence, is essentially resulting from
a real sector crisis where developed country workers no
longer perceive needs for bigger and more cars, for
example. The aggregate demand, therefore, needs to come
from elsewhere. If wage levels double in the poor coun-
tries, this could be a source of increase in aggregate
demand for quality goods produced in the rich countries, if
even a part of the increase in wages is directed to them.
Thus globalisation needs transnational corporations to
look at this balancing of interest by seeing what percentage
of their demand is from middle class or lower class unskilled
workers and whether the increase in aggregate demand
from this section through higher minimum wages would
compensate the increase in costs on a part of the value
chain.
One possible solution16 is to look for corporate leaders
who will use this opportunity to do good and build on the
corporate social responsibility image, and this would lead
to a social imitation effect on other businesses located in
the region. Each large company could be given responsi-
bility to start the process in one country to get an imitation
effect by other local actors.16 Suggested by Benoit Lecat, Marketing Professor at the Burgundy
School of Business.Workers in developed countries
The workers in rich countries would gain in terms of
stability of employment as well as a reduction in unem-
ployment, as businesses in their countries benefit from the
increase in effective demand from workers in less devel-
oped countries.
Secondly, if wages go up in poor countries, without
corresponding productivity increases, the need for capital
to leave developed countries would be less and workers in
developed countries would again gain from stability of
employment.
Businesses in developing countries
If there were to be a party sustaining a loss in this situation,
it is likely to be businesses in developing countries which
would need to pay their workers more and also pay extra
taxes to pay the public sector workers more.
As against this, they would gain by the increase in
effective demand. To the extent that local dollars would
be spent more locally than on imports, local businesses
would make huge gains. The Keynesian multiplier is
likely to be very beneficial to the local businessman
because low income people have a high marginal propen-
sity to consume.
As the private sector or much of it in poor countries is
micro-enterprise in nature and is self-employed (with no
other employees), it would not be affected by the increase
in wages. Therefore, they would only gain by the increase
in effective demand till they reached the point that they
would like to employ someone.
The effect on small, medium, and large businesses
would be mixed, depending, as indicated above, on positive
demand side effects and negative cost side effects. These
cost side effects may also reduce exports and reduce the
international competitiveness of these countries. An
example would be the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. By
ensuring public employment to rural workers at a minimum
wage, it raises the wage levels in farm labour (Thadathil &
Mohandas, 2012). This in turn adversely affects the profits
of farmers.
To the extent, perhaps large, that most of these busi-
nesses are exporting primary products facing inelastic
demand, the impact would again be mitigated, especially if
the increase in minimum wages is synchronised to take
effect all over the world, so that competition between poor
exporting nations is not impacted in the model.
However, business people in this part of the world may
not have the education required to understand the positive
medium term impact of increase in wages nor the infra-
structural support to compare this with the higher imme-
diate tax burdens.
Workers in poor countries
The workers in poor countries would gain immediately
owing to the increase in their salaries. On the one hand,
there may be some short term disemployment which
affects the poorest of the poor and on the other hand, they
14 A. Ashtawill gain in employment as the economy expands with the
Keynesian multiplier. In Brazil, it was found that except for
the poorest workers in the private sector, everybody else
gained (Lemos, 2007). The visible gains may be limited to
workers in the formal sector, as shown in a study in
Nicaragua (Gindling & Terrell, 2010) but there may be
a trickle-down effect to workers in the informal sector.
Governments in poor countries
In the view of critiques of aid (Calderisi, 2006; Easterly, 2006;
Moyo, 2009), the politicians of poor countries are corrupt
because of aid. In fact, they use violence and corruption to
access and maintain their positions, as it allows them to get
the aidmoney and to distribute this largesse, thus enhancing
their economic and image motives.
This stakeholder, therefore, would find it difficult to
increase minimum wages because it would further eat up
into his budget financed by aid and limit the amount of
discretionary funds. Even if governments can simply
increase taxes to finance public sector wage increases
(Lemos, 2007), this is not easy in a poor country with
a small formal sector. Therefore, the governments may
hesitate to increase minimum wages because the public
sector itself cannot afford it.
Moreover, as we saw in Honduras and in Somalia, if the
politician is dependent on the rich to keep him in power,
then he would align his interest with the local rich stake-
holder. Their interest may lie in increasing wages or not,
depending on their education level and their ability to
perceive the impact on demand for their goods as a result
of the increased wages, and their comparison of this with
the extra tax burden to finance the increased wages.
What about inflation and distortions?
An increase in salaries would lead to spiralling inflation if
we were anywhere near full employment, either in the
developed world or in the developing countries. To the
extent there is significant unemployment and excess
capacity in both worlds, inflation is not a credible threat.Table 2 Minimum income levels required to escape poverty lin
Per day
Poorest Poor
Poverty line in USD ppp $1.00 $2.00
Single person $1.00 $2.00
Couplea $2.00 $4.00
Single parent with 3 children $4.00 $8.00
Couple with 6 children $8.00 $16.00
Poverty line in countries with ppp of 0.5
Poverty line in USD (real) $0.50 $1.00
Single person $0.50 $1.00
Couple $1.00 $2.00
Single parent with 3 children $2.00 $4.00
Couple with 6 children $4.00 $8.00
a The multiple factors taken are for quick back of the envelop calcul
precise multiples can be factored in. For example, French INSEE calcul
per child.However, if supply cannot meet the increase in demand
immediately, owing to structural rigidities, it is possible
that there could be interim periods of inflation.
This inflation could be used by some businessmen as an
opportunity for intermediate gains (see Veblen, 1904).
However, to the extent that businessmen are informed
about this proposed change in law and are prepared to
meet it, the transition can be fairly smooth.
A more comprehensive analysis of inflation and the
impact of any global minimum wage on this, and of both
together on poverty, is left for future research. An analysis
of the nature of supply side bottlenecks, including licensing
and other forms of limiting competition would have to be
part of any such study.
The financing of the solution
It has been my tenet in this paper that in any economy, the
purpose of redistribution is to keep the money going around
so that powerful stakeholders can continue to win again
and again. In as much as a minimum wage is a source of
redistribution, it needs to be financed by those who are
going to gain by the increased productivity as well as by the
increase in aggregate demand. Perhaps some amount of
unemployment in the private sector could result. But this
could be compensated by higher import agencies revenues
as well as higher tourism based revenues as their countries
develop and open up to the world. If aggregate demand
increases, employment and growth should come in.
Thus, identification of stakeholders who gain from
increases in minimum wages in specific countries and
industries is required so that appropriate taxation can be
introduced on those profiting from all the benefits of
minimum wages including improved security in the country.
The gains from trade as a result of the increase in effective
demand are also going to developed countries. Therefore,
there is a case to tax imports, or to avoid distortions, to
provide increased official public aid based on taxation of
firms and labour in the developed world.
Some small businesses could restructure themselves as
partnerships with their (former) employees to escape thees of $1 per day and $2 per day.
Per month Per year
Poorest Poor Poorest Poor
$30.00 $60.00 $365.00 $730.00
$30.00 $60.00 $365.00 $730.00
$60.00 $120.00 $730.00 $1460.00
$120.00 $240.00 $1460.00 $2920.00
$240.00 $480.00 $2920.00 $5840.00
$15.00 $30.00 $182.50 $365.00
$15.00 $30.00 $182.50 $365.00
$30.00 $60.00 $365.00 $730.00
$60.00 $120.00 $730.00 $1460.00
$120.00 $240.00 $1460.00 $2920.00
ations for the reader to follow. In a more exact formulation, more
ation uses 1 unit per single adult þ 0.5 units per other adults þ 0.3
Table 3 Minimum income levels required to escape poverty lines of $1.25 per day and $2.50 per day.
Per day Per month Per year
Poorest Poor Poorest Poor Poorest Poor
Poverty line in USD $1.25 $2.50 $37.50 $75.00 $456.25 $912.50
Single person $1.25 $2.50 $37.50 $75.00 $456.25 $912.50
Couple $2.50 $5.00 $75.00 $150.00 $912.50 $1825.00
Single parent with 3 children $5.00 $10.00 $150.00 $300.00 $1825.00 $3650.00
Couple with 6 children $10.00 $20.00 $300.00 $600.00 $3650.00 $7300.00
Poverty line in USS ppp of 0.5
Poverty line in USD $0.63 $1.25 $18.75 $37.50 $228.13 $456.25
Single person $0.63 $1.25 $18.75 $37.50 $228.13 $456.25
Couple $1.25 $2.50 $37.50 $75.00 $456.25 $912.50
Single parent with 3 children $2.50 $5.00 $75.00 $150.00 $912.50 $1825.00
Couple with 6 children $5.00 $10.00 $150.00 $300.00 $1825.00 $3650.00
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 15harshness of doubling of labour costs. As a result, they pass
on the risks as well as their profits to their workers.
However, to some extent, they would still prefer to retain
their high marginal productivity workers for resource based
profitability in the sense that they need to have emergency
solutions when more than one customer walks into a shop.
This public aid could be regressive: reducing each year
by, say 10%, to reflect the increased ability of the poor
country to meet its needs thanks to growth ushered in by
the initial increase in effective demand.
Finally, international private foundations may want to
link their names with financing of the minimum wage in
poor countries in order to get the image boost they crave.
Similarly corporations who gain from such redistribution in
any case may find it worthwhile to indicate their support as
part of their corporate social responsibility image building.
Conclusion
This is a draft of a simple proposal to meet the Millennium
Goals of 2015 or reducing poverty by half. We admit it is
a face-saving proposal to honour a (foolish, daring?
compelling?) promise. It is not a market-based solution, but
such market-restricting policies are followed even in
developed “capitalist” countries because they are useful
and grounded in political realities.17
Two major limitations of this proposal are that most of
those in poverty are those who are not formally employed
and that the minimum wages in most developing countries
apply only to formal employment. However, it has been
suggested that the working poor are a part of the problem
and we cannot ignore them and raising their standard of
living to $1 ppp a day per person would be an easier task in
the African context than attaining this income level for17 A market-based solution to global poverty may require taking
out minimum wages all over the world, thus reducing incentives to
migrate, reducing over-incentives to education in the developed
world, reducing unemployment in the developed world and
creating need for excess capital to flow to less developed countries
for fructification. However, the global lowering of wages may
transfer (in)security issues from the developing world to the
developed world.those who are not working, in the next five years. Moreover,
improving the lot of the working poor in the formal sector
would create other motivation, linkage and multiplier
effects over time.
The solution proposes setting a global minimum wage
rate at $120 a month in terms of ppp or real $60 a month in
the countries under consideration where ppp was about
0.5. Individual countries may choose to have higher
minimum wage rates. The solution corresponds to
a purchasing power parity of $4 a day, enough for a single
parent family of four to survive on or for a working couple
with six children. If we work at $1.25 per day, we are
talking about a minimum global wage rate of real $75
a month or a ppp $150 a month.
The reason that it needs to be global is that with a single
country increasing its wages, there will be a loss of relative
competitiveness, but if all countries with similar produc-
tivity levels increase their minimum wages, the relative
impact will be less. Perhaps this logic was best captured by
Marx and Engels (1848, Ch. 4): “Workers of the world
unite”. They had probably never considered that anything
can be achieved by workers in any one country alone.
The thrust of our paper is on the difficulties of imple-
mentation, and suggests that the solution requires a lot of
horse trading to obtain that aid be redirected towards
financing the cost of the wage increase, and admitting that
the solution is being directly applied only to those who
already have some employment so that at least their lot
will be improved and in the hope that their increased
demand will rub off on those not having any, thus paving
the way for the next “progressive” goals to be adopted in
2015. Overcoming resistance to changes requires new
institutions (Marti, 2009). Overcoming global resistance to
global changes may require new or reinforced global
institutions.
A large part of capturing benefits for those with nothing
would be to find ways to stop people from working in the
informal economy once they already have public sector
jobs. To some extent, a backward sloping supply curve of
labour, where leisure becomes important after one earns
some minimum, may help, but it is unlikely that this
happens at $1 a day.
More important would be some way of enforcing these
rules either through education or through policing. But both
16 A. Ashtaof these are expensive solutions. It is possible that as public
sector workers reach the limit of their capacity to earn,
they would hire servants and other help at domicile, thus
adding to informal employment and reducing poverty to
some extent. Therefore, there may be hope for even the
poorest of the poor.
The consumer finance based microfinance sector would
particularly welcome this solution. With rising wages, they
could lend more to the poor. A concern should be to orient
this consumer spending to productive or social uses such as
education, health, and transport, rather than conspicuous
consumption on marriages and luxury goods. However,
money being fungible, this may not be easy. At best we
could try to reduce the interest burden by offering lower
interest rates than the moneylender.
It would be sufficient, as suggested by Basu (2004) that
all the employers get together and introduce efficiency
wages at $4 per day ppp, voluntarily, to stimulate produc-
tivity and reduce shirking, but this may be more difficult to
obtain in the short run till 2015, because it means changing
culture which takes time. Therefore, we stick to this
exogenous minimum wage proposal.
If it works, we would have shown that Africans can have
success even if the goals were set unfairly to Africa as
suggested by Easterly (2009), and even if the success on
these two indicators does not guarantee that people would
have sufficient food on their tables.
This would then give us courage to revise these minimum
wages upwards to attain a ppp of $2.50 per person or $10
per family of four ($300 per month) over the next 15 years
till 2030. Raising the standards of living for the working
class will mean more motivation to get education, better
health and sanitation leading to higher productivity, and
more stable cash flow microfinance borrowers for consumer
lenders. This solution is therefore a part of the total solu-
tion creating linkages with the others.18 The ILO database for Wages and Income also broadly
confirms the figures for Burkina Faso if we take 25 working days per
month: SMAG (agricultural workers) 152.46 francs CFA per hour
($US 0.26 e 2003) ($PPP 0.89 e 2003) 1219.68 francs CFA per day
($US 2.10 e 2003) ($PPP 7.15 e 2003) (8 h per day). SMIG (non-
agricultural workers) 166.034 francs CFA per hour ($US 0.29 e 2003)
($PPP 0.97 e 2003). Note ppp is now 0.43 in 2009 in Burkina Faso as
opposed to 0.36 in 2003 (World Bank).
19 A software engineer I met was earning 150,000 CFA per month.
His family included his wife and one child. So, per head they were
earning 50,000 CFA per month. This is a little over $100 a month per
person. Since he needed to work in a different city and maintain
separate residences, I explained to him that by my calculations of
taking out the expenses of the second residence, he was poor,
though perhaps not among the poorest. He explained that every-
body had some unofficial income from the informal economy to
survive.Appendix 1
MDG Goal 1
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1a: Reduce by half the proportion of people living
on less than a dollar a day
1.1 Proportion of population below $1 (ppp) per day
1.2 Poverty gap ratio
1.3 Share of poorest quintile in national consumption
Target 1b: Achieve full and productive employment and
decent work for all, including women and young people
1.4 Growth rate of GDP per person employed
1.5 Employment-to-population ratio
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below $1
(ppp) per day
1.7 Proportion of own-account and contributing family
workers in total employment
Target 1c: Reduce by half the proportion of people who
suffer from hunger
1.8 Prevalence of underweight children under five years
of age
1.9 Proportion of population below minimum level of
dietary energy consumption
Source:http://www.undp.org/mdg/goal1.shtml.Appendix 2
An application
This part details our alternative simple solution, the
appreciation of which requires understanding some simpli-
fied numbers.
At the Ouagadougou conference, I learnt from a human
resource consultant that the minimum wage rate was about
$55 a month (later confirmed by another person),18 that
a fresh business school graduate would be lucky to earn
$200 a month and high level managers earn about $600
a month (Ashta & Fall, 2012). What this means is that most
people who need to earn $1 a day to be considered “not
poor”, could easily get out of poverty through minimum
wage jobs in the public sector, as suggested by Karnani
(Karnani, 2007). However, this is true only if they are
single. If they are the sole-earner in a couple, they now
need $60 per month to escape poverty ($2  30), as shown
in Table 2. If the couple has an average of six children, they
need $240 per month to escape poverty ($2  8  30). What
this means is that only the high level mangers escape
poverty, unless both parents work. Thus a woman, with six
children, may also need to work and provide, say $60 and
the man could provide the remaining $180, or vice versa.
Clearly, except for highly educated graduates with consid-
erable experience, this solution is inadequate.
Of course, the example is a bit of an exaggeration. First,
owing to high mortality rates, only some survive and the
average family may have only three or four surviving chil-
dren. But it is more probable that the parents die first and
the average family may be single parent at best. So, with
one parent and three children, we come back to the same
figures as earlier. The single parent now needs to earn $120
per month (earlier the couple needed to earn $240).
The second exaggeration is having taken ppp dollar rates
and not real dollars. The minimum wage approximation of
$55 corresponds to a minimum wage of approximately CFA
22,000 in West Africa. If we use purchasing power parities
of 0.5 to keep it simple, this is perhaps accurate to say that
this money reflects a ppp of $110 per month. Thus to get
out of poverty, a single parent with three children who
needed $120 in ppp terms, needs only $60 in real dollar
terms. However, even most people with low education in
the public sector are rarely earning even $60.19
A minimum wage solution to halving world poverty by 2015 17Most workers are therefore working at some monthly
salary between $55 and $60 ($110 pppe$120 ppp) if they
have a full time job. In short, they are working to remain
poor. At these levels, getting out of poverty is not possible,
even if we follow the solution of employing everyone at the
minimum wage for public sector employment as suggested
by Karnani (Karnani, 2007), and ignoring the inflationary
effect of increasing effective demand and limited supply of
consumption goods, given the inter-sectoral rigidities in the
economy.
If we want to halve poverty, we need a new comple-
mentary solution. If we need to halve poverty by 2015, the
solution needs to be miraculously short in application time.
To work, it must be simple enough to be understood. To be
applied, it must allow all stakeholders to benefit.
The proposed solution is to increase minimum wages to
$120 per month in terms of ppp all over the world, or at least
in Africa. The global application replies to globalisation. This
would allow all the working poor families to escape abject
poverty since the average income of this single earner family
of four becomes $30 (ppp) a month of $1 ppp a day, the MDG
target. The solutionmust be applied to public sector workers
and to private sector workers. If 50% of the country’s adults
are employed in salaried jobs below the poverty line, this will
allow 50% of the country to get out of poverty. The closer
a country’s minimal wage is to this level, the less the effort it
must make to make people cross the bar. The immediate
Millennium Goals for 2015 will be achieved and our promises
will be met, even to Africans. We can then pause before
making more promises to the other half!
The solution does not need new laws as minimum wage
laws exist in almost all countries. It needs just a change in
the application decree for the amount of what constitutes
the minimum wage. So, the application time is short. It
suffices to do this in 2014 because it will probably take four
years for all the stakeholders to agree to do this.
The figure of $1 ppp per day per person or $120 ppp for
a family of four translates into $15 per month per person or
$60 per month for a family of four. Just the minimum
additional distortion has been introduced in the market to
achieve the Millennium Goals. If we want $1.25 per day, to
conform to the revised World Bank rates, an intermediate
wage rate of $150 a month in ppp ($75 in real USD) would
suffice, as shown in Table 3. The exact number can be
discussed as a second step after a buy-in to the basic
solution proposed here.
Of course, we have limited our discussion to eradicating
extreme poverty among the working poor by 2015. If we
want to go further for the next millennium development
goals, we can try to reduce poverty for the working classes
and take them to $2 or $2.50 per day.
The solution needs to be global to avoid distortions and
cheating by some countries attempting to gain at the
comparative cost of others.References
Allaire, V., Ashta, A., Attuel-Mendes, L., & Krishnaswamy, K.
(2009). The success of Moroccan microfinance institutions: more
than just culture? Euro-Mediterranean Economics and Finance
Review 2, 2.Ashta, A. (Sept 23 2000). France shortens work-week: sharing
scarce jobs. Economic and Political Weekly.
Ashta, A. (2009). Corporate social responsibility in the dynamic
information age of inter-systems connectivity. Journal of Elec-
tronic Commerce in Organizations, 7, 18e34.
Ashta, A., & Fall, N. S. (2012). Institutional analysis to understand
the growth of microfinance institutions in West African
economic and monetary union. Corporate Governance, 12,
441e459.
Ashta, A., Khan, S., & Otto, P. E. (2011). Does microfinance
cause or reduce suicides? Policy recommendations for reducing
borrower stress. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstractZ1715442.
Basu, B. (2004). Another look at wage distortion in a developing
dual economy. Australian Economic Papers, 43, 208e227.
Bernabe, S., & Kolev, A. (2005). Jobless or working poor in the
Kyrgyz labour market: what role for social policies? Social Policy
& Administration, 39, 409e430.
Berner, M., Ozer, T., & Paynter, S. (2008). A portrait of hunger, the
social safety net, and the working poor. Policy Studies Journal,
36, 403e420.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1965). The calculus of consent:
Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Calderisi, R. (2006). The trouble with Africa: Why foreign aid isn’t
working. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chen, S., & Ravallion, M. (2008). The developing world is poorer
than we thought, but no less successful in the fight against
poverty (August 1, 2008). World Bank, Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstractZ1259575 Policy Research Working
Paper.
Dalgaard, C.-J., & Erickson, L. (2009). Reasonable expectations and
the first millennium development goal: how much can aid
achieve? World Development, 37, 1170e1181.
Devereux, S. (2005). Can minimum wages contribute to poverty
reduction in poor countries? Journal of International Develop-
ment, 17, 899e912.
Draper, R., & Maitre, P. (2009). Shattered Somalia. National
Geographic, 216, 70e97.
Easterly, W. (2006). The white man’s burden: Why the West’s
efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good.
London, U.K.: Penguin Books.
Easterly, W. (2009). How the millennium development goals are
unfair to Africa. World Development, 37, 26e35.
Freeman, R. E., & Liedtka, J. (1991). Corporate social responsi-
bility: a critical approach. Business Horizons, 34, 92e98.
Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine.
Gindling, T. H., & Terrell, K. (2010). Minimum wages, globalization,
and poverty in Honduras. World Development, 38, 908e918.
Gindling, T. H., & Trejos, J. D. (2005). Accounting for changing
earnings inequality in Costa Rica, 1980e99. Journal of Devel-
opment Studies, 41, 898e926.
Hill, R. P., & Cassill, D. L. (2004). The naturological view of the
corporation and its social responsibility: an extension of the
Frederick model of corporationecommunity relationships.
Business & Society Review. ISSN: 00453609, 109. ISSN:
00453609, 281e296.
ILO. (2008). Executive summary: Global wage report: 2008/09.
International Labour Organization.
ILO. (2009). Global wage report: 2009 Update. International Labour
Organization.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. (1986a). Fairness as
a constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market.
American Economic Review, 76, 728.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986b). Fairness and
the assumptions of economics. Journal of Business, 59,
S285eS300.
18 A. AshtaKarnani, A. (2007). The mirage of marketing to the bottom of the
pyramid: how the private sector can help alleviate poverty.
California Management Review, 49, 90e111.
Lemos, S. (2007). Minimum wage effects across the private and
public sectors in Brazil. Journal of Development Studies, 43,
700e720.
Mair, J., & Marti, I. (2009). Entrepreneurship in and around insti-
tutional voids: a case study from Bangladesh. Journal of Busi-
ness Venturing, 24, 419e435.
Marlar, J. (2010). Few sub-Saharan Africans aware of local micro-
finance options. Gallup Poll Briefing.
Marti, I. (2009). Organisations et resistance: Acteurs (in)habituels,
contextes (in)habituels (French). Revue franc¸aise de gestion,
107e132.
Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1848). The communist manifesto.
Means, G., & Schneider, D. (2000). Metacapitalism: The e-business
revolution and the design of 21st century companies and
markets. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Millennium Development Goals Report 2009. United Nations.
Moyo, D. (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is
a better way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Prahalad, C. K. (2006). The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid:
Eradicating poverty through profits. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
The Wharton School Publishing.Roodman, D., & Morduch, J. (2009). The impact of microcredit on
the poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting the evidence. CGD Working
Paper. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.
Sachs, J. D. (2005). The end of poverty: Economic possibilities for
our time. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Soto, H. D. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism
triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. London, U.K:
Black Swan.
Stormer, F. (2003). Making the shift: moving from “Ethics pays” to
an inter-systems model of business. Journal of Business Ethics,
44, 279e289.
Thadathil, M. S., & Mohandas, V. (2012). Impact of MGNREGS on
labour supply to agricultural sector of Wayanad District in Ker-
ala. Agricultural Economics Research Review, 25, 151e155.
Todorovic, Z. W., & Ma, J. (2008). A review of minimum wage
regulation effect: the resource-based view perspective. Journal
of Collective Negotiations, 32, 57e75.
Veblen, T. (1904). The theory of business enterprise.
Wheeler, D., Colbert, B., & Freeman, R. E. (2003). Focusing on
value: reconciling corporate social responsibility, Sustainability
and a stakeholder approach in a network world. Journal of
General Management, 28, 1e28.
Yunus, M. (2003). Banker to the poor: Micro-lending and the battle
against world poverty. New York: Public Affairs.
